The Rise of Hindutva

Pranab Kanti Basu

All majoritarian populisms are based on claims of ethnic purity and the 'true people' of a nation. Hindutva, the Indian variant, is based on a constructed religious identity that claims Aryan purity (contradicting all genetic profiling) and exclusive right to the entire land of this country. Its bible is Essentials of Hindutva by Savarkar, which is replete with fantastic history, original linguistic theories, and statements of political purpose in a strange mishmash. But it gives a pithy, answer to the question of 'who is a Hindu'? which was later officially approved by the RSS: one to whom "this Bharata bhumi... is at once... fatherland and holy land". The othering is very significant: through clever categorising the Muslims (and the Christians, Jews, etc) are marked as The Other. Savarkar's definition is a handy tool for coopting the SCs and STs into the Hindutva fold, though Essentials as well as the writings of Golwalkar, Hedgewar and other leaders of RSS are full of praises for the caste system and derogation of the Sudras and outcastes.

Hindutva did not gain traction during the independence struggle for two reasons. First the communal organisations, like Hindu Mahasabha and Muslim League were busy currying favour with the British masters, to extract better deals for their respective communities. Secondly, as clearly expressed by Golwalkar in Bunch of Thoughts, the nationalist struggle was deemed detrimental to the cause of Hindutva as instead of the 'other' of the 'Hindus' it posed the Britishers as the enemy. Hindutva did not get any leverage in the independence struggle, defeated by a more potent populism-Gandhism, and also, since the 1920s, by the grassroots organisation of the Congress, which attracted some peasant base through its anti-rent stirs. (Though these were never accorded recognition by the party high command, they did serve to gain the sympathy of segments of the peasants.) (Sanyal, Hitesh Ranjan).

Gandhi's pervasive popularity flowed largely from his enigmatic image and his astuteness as an organiser. His mendicant's attire, his frequent fasts, his prayer meetings all combined to spread an image of a messiah as Chatterjee (2004) illustrates from a passage Dhorai Charit Manas by Satinath Bhaduri. In fact, it was the undefined character of Gandhi that attracted people from various stations. As an organiser he had no parallel in the Congress. He was reaching out to the people even before Congress had decided on mass mobilisations. He astutely lent support to the Khilafat movement to win over even those who accepted foreign spiritual leadership. He chose, quite brazenly, to support movements that had potential for mass mobilisation, even when they clashed with his much-vaunted idealism. In reply to Tagore's criticism that his politics was deviating from his philosophy he replied that the poet lived for a beautiful future but he has seen that singing Kabir bhajans to a sick man does not ameliorate his   suffering.   (Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, 1997/2001).

Gandhi and Gandhism became a vaguely defined anchor to all the multifarious movements bringing together many varied, often opposed, interests. The continuous mass movement strategy that Gandhi adopted (anti-Rowlatt movement, 1919, movement for swaraj in 1920, the boycott movement, etc.) all built up a frenzy of anti-British mass action. This created a nebulous idea of nationalism that was defined as the negative of British rule. It did not have the positive content of, say, Hindutva's nationalism. Paradoxically, that was the source of its vast popularity.

Post Independence
The independence movement succeeded in driving out the British, but a nation as an identity of the population was not born. The population was held together both through persuasion and coercion by the state. This narrative is based on a critical reading of the theories presented by Partha Chatterjee, Kalyan Sanyal and Ajit Chowdhury. The population can be segmented into three parts: centre, margin and margin of margin. Those belonging to the centre or capitalist sector are conditioned to the mores of bourgeois civil society and are obedient citizens of the state. Those belonging to the margins, dwellers of shanties besides the railways, bustling urban bustees, for example, are not conditioned to accept civil society rights and duties, simply because the capitalist economy does not sustain their lives. To persuade these marginal people to maintain order, the state has to stretch or even break their own laws to ensure their livelihood. Capitalist expansion cannot accommodate the marginal people, termed 'surplus population' as workers and so they have to be allowed survival in the unorganised, self-employed sector as hawkers, artisan producers, rickshaw pullers, etc, or as casual employees in the service sector. Both their dwellings as well as their means of livelihood frequently violate laws and are the subject of political negotiation between their community leaders and the state. That is why Chatterjee refers to this space as political society. Beyond this, there is an outer circle, inhabited mainly by tribals, whose traditional community rights continue to frustrate the drive of the mining lobby to extract ores and miner­als, apart from thwarting the logging mafia. A large segment of this population has already been displaced by the Mega development projects of modernising India, like dams, highways, thermal power projects and mines. Some idea of the extent of such displacement can be formed from the writings of Walter Fernandez and others. These outcastes of the modern state cannot be accommodated through persuasion. To these are added ethnic and religious minorities. Brutal state violence is unleashed on these populations whenever they protest the discriminatory treatment meted out to them. The colonial laws were applied in deeply unequal manner and this has been retained and further strengthened by the independent state. Acts, suspending normal democratic rights and judicial procedures, like the AFSPA, UAPA, TADA and the formation of more than a dozen paramilitary forces testifies to the reli­ance of the state on violence.

The pervasive state was tol­erated by the ruling classes because it suited their interests. The industrial bourgeoisie did not possess sufficient private funds to finance mega projects like power, transport network, steel plants. There was also a very meagre supply of engineering and managerial staff. They, therefore, welcomed a Planning Commission that would rationally plan investments in infrastructure and heavy and basic industries. The state sector also funded higher education and set up the IITs and IIMs to provide technically skilled personnel at subsidised rates to the private sector. The middle classes, born of the colonial urban pen-pushers and government job holders, welcomed the expansion of the state sector as it provided secure jobs to their progeny. The farm sector, which had not undergone a transition to large capitalist farming because the weak state, in its endeavour to balance the support of the powerful classes, could not undertake drastic land reforms and agriculture lacked structural intention and capital to modernise. This ultimately led to a food crisis in the mid-sixties. USA bailed India out of this crisis on condition that the government pushed the Green Revolution strategy. This was a package consisting of HYV seeds, chemical fertilisers, pesticides, mechanisation and controlled water supply the year round, to facilitate multiple cropping. To promote this strategy the state had to provide huge subsidies for seeds, fertilisers, chemicals and farm equipment. American interest lay in marketing inputs. Productivity did increase till the mid-seventies, though unevenly in terms of crops and regions. A class of rich farmers was born that was increasingly dependent on state subsidies because of declining soil fertility.

The 'integrated state' that was deeply involved in economic activities that are the preserve of private capitalists in developed capitalist countries was accepted as a kind of disinterested mediator between the powerful classes. This statist model was largely successful till the end of the 'Nehru era', that ended with the death of Jawaharlal Nehru in 1964. The balance of economic power had been shifting towards the monopoly industrial capitalists, while the rich farmers' dependence on the state increased. Monopoly capital, whose growth had been facilitated by the integral state, now started resenting the overbearing presence of the state in the economic sector. The state's credibility as an arbiter declined. This was corelated with the political crisis within the Congress. When Indira Gandhi assumed the reigns of the party, her insecurity induced her to do away with internal democracy within the party and introduce the principle of central nomination of every tier of leaders. This reduced the rural popularity of the party, which was mainly based on the acceptance of local leaders. The political and economic crisis that was brewing came to a boil with the imposition of internal emergency in 1975.

Meanwhile, the Hindutva brigade, that had been forced to keep a low profile, following the largely perceived role of the RSS in Gandhi's murder, had been spreading its message through its large network of educational institutions. These were based mainly in tribal areas that were neglected by government school­ing network, guided by the RSS and funded frequently by NRIs. Apart from standard schooling these hosted weekly religious meetings where all locals were welcome. Its political wing, first the Jana Sangh and later the Bharatiya Janata Party were gradually emerging from the shadows as mainstream parties. They could finally shed their outcaste status when they were welcomed into the coalition of parties opposing the emergency.

The economic policy changes that had been brewing culminated in the adoption of the Liberalisation, Privatisation and Globalisation (LPG) package in 1991. Though this was adopted by the Congress government under Narasimha Rao, its aggressive implementation had to await the installation of the brazenly Hindutvavadi government of Modi in 2014. The Congress party and government were not in sync on this issue. A large state sector and control over 'the commanding heights' was necessary to implement economic policies that would suit the party's support base. Neither could the non- Congress governments before Modi afford to implement LPG unequivocally. But the aggressive Hindutva of the current regime does not rely on economic success or amelioration of poverty for its support base. The populism of Gandhi that fostered the support base of the Congress at the time of independence has long eroded. Populism has now taken the form of Hindu nationalism reified in the body of the macho male image of Modi and periodically expressed in mass frenzy of mosque demolition, rioting and killing, brutal torture of minorities and Dalits by non-state forces like Ram Sene or Bajrang Dal, with the tacit consent of the state. The victims of rising inequality and poverty, among the Hindus, probably find a release from the mundane through identification with the violent Hindutva brigades. It is this support base, divorced from economic performance that allows the present regime to go all out to implement pro-big capital measures that the Congress hesitated over labour codes, relaxation of restrictions on acquisition of land for mining, accelerating privatisation, etc.

There is also a reverse causality from neoliberalism to neo-conservatism. The burgeoning corruption starting from the closing years of the integral state and the aggressive pro-corporate measures of the current regime have eroded the sense of democratic values of modernisation. Like in many Western democracies, this has given way to a narrow nationalism based on majoritarian religious community solidarity as the new morality of the country.

References
Sanyal, Hitesh Ranjan 'Arambager jatiyotabadi andolon', Anya Artha No. 6&7, 1974-75,
'Bankura jelar jatioyotabadi andolon', Anya Artha, No. 10.1977.
Chatterjee P. (2004) The Politics of the Governed.
Bhattacharyya, Sabyasachi. 1997/ 2001 The Mahatma and the Poet.
Caudhury, A., Das, D., Chakraborti, A. 2002. margin of margin: Pro­file of an Unrepentant Colonial Collaborator.
Sanyal, K. 2007. Rethinking Capi­talist Development.
Fernandes, W. 2007. Development-Induced Displacement: The Class and Gender Perspective.

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Frontier Autumn Number
Vol 58, No. 14 - 17, Sep 28 - Oct 25, 2025